The ESG Rating Game: Deviation, Disagreement, and Greenwashing
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Q Duan, Y Song, R Wang, J Yang…
Mathematical …, 2026
Wiley Online Library
Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings are pivotal in sustainable investing, informing portfolio construction and regulatory compliance. We develop a game‐theoretic principal–agent model involving ESG‐conscious investors and competing rating agencies. Investors impose ESG‐related portfolio constraints by selecting ratings from different agencies, while agencies strategically issue ESG ratings based on a trade‐off between financial incentives related to market share and reputational risks from deviating from ESG …
